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Abstract

The resurgence of voluntary markets in which consumers can purchase carbon credits generated
by agricultural carbon sequestration has brought up many questions for farmers looking to
potentially enter the market. Past carbon markets, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange, ended
when a recession hit, causing demand for credits to swiftly decline. How can modern voluntary
markets face these challenges along with new ones and be successful? This research paper,
completed as an undergraduate thesis project at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, examines the
economic and scientific factors behind soil carbon sequestration credits. An extended literature
review combined with estimation of a supply curve and equilibrium price for the market are used
to provide farmers and the public with information about expected sequestration rates and costs
for regenerative agricultural practices. The science behind no-till and cover crop carbon
sequestration is explained as well as the economics behind production of carbon offsets by farmers
and demand from consumers. Using data values found in existing scientific literature, a theoretical
market supply curve and equilibrium price are created that can be used as a basis for further
research.
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Introduction

Since the Earth was formed, its climate has varied drastically (Ghil 2002). Periods of warming and
cooling have occurred as slow processes over millions of years, but within the last 150 years
anthropogenic activity has resulted in a much faster warming than ever measured before (USGCRP
2017). Due to our reliance on fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive activities, Earth now has a
“carbon budget” (Le Quere et al 2018) defined as the remaining amount of carbon dioxide our
collective society can emit before a tipping point of 1.5°C warming. The lifespan of this budget is
not long in comparison to the rate at which we are transitioning towards carbon neutrality, and any
action we can take to extend the budget is critical to avoiding the worst effects of global climate
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change. Soil sequestration of organic carbon is one solution to drawing down levels of atmospheric
carbon dioxide (Lal 2004) that has the potential to be greatly increased.
While some industrial sectors are focused on creating mechanical methods of capturing carbon
from the air, a natural method already exists: plants. The global carbon cycle is repeated every
year as plants start to grow in the spring and throughout the summer and then become dormant or
die in the fall and winter (Post et al 1990). In order to grow, plants perform photosynthesis to store
sugars and produce energy. One of the main inputs in this process is carbon dioxide, which the
plants gather from the air. As most plants grow, the carbon that was stored as sugar is used to
produce biomass, making up a majority of the plant’s structures. Part of the biomass of the plant
will be located under the soil in the form of stems or roots (Sokol et al 2018). When the plant
eventually dies, the biomass in the soil is decomposed and turned into soil organic carbon (SOC).
If the soil is not disturbed, this carbon will remain in the ground for hundreds of years before reentering the atmospheric pool.
The study of soil sequestration to mitigate climate change is based on this concept. In the United
States alone, over 897 million acres (about twice the area of Alaska) of land are farmed annually
(USDA-NASS 2020), but only about 140 million of these acres are enrolled in federal farm
conservation programs (USDA-NASS 2017). Regenerative agricultural practices such as no-till,
cover crops, crop rotation, and limited application of chemical fertilizer are often a requirement of
these programs and have the result of increasing soil carbon sequestration rates. While 140 million
acres is a large area (about the size of New York and California combined) there still exists
potential to store more carbon in our soils.
Besides carbon sequestration, there are many benefits to practicing regenerative agriculture, such
as increased biodiversity, reduced runoff, minimized soil erosion, and improved ecosystem
5

resilience (White 2020). There might also be costs, including potential initial costs such as the
purchase of new equipment or greater time spent working (Manley et al 2005). A farmer’s job
includes risk assessment; they must use data and prior knowledge to make decisions for what and
how much to plant, how much fertilizer to apply, how much to irrigate, etc. (Selvaraju 2012). For
this reason, most farmers tend to prefer to use methods of farming that are familiar and reliable
and are hesitant to switch to something new. Poor implementation of a new practice could result
in a loss of income that the farmer and his or her family is counting on. Therefore, regenerative
agricultural practices are often incentivized by the government to encourage farmers to adopt them.
The results of these practices are a net benefit to society, so the government justifies the taxpayer
expense.
Incentives do not always come from governments, however. Producers can be enticed to farm
using carbon sequestering methods if they can accurately quantify and then sell the amount of
carbon dioxide that has been sequestered as a carbon offset credit. In this way, the free market
works to internalize a negative externality (carbon dioxide emissions) by making the externality a
commodity that has value (Varadarajan 2020). Demand also must exist for the market to sustain
itself. If there is great demand from consumers and businesses to offset carbon intensive activities
such as flying in a plane, the price paid to farmers per ton of carbon dioxide sequestered will be
higher and more producers will be likely to use sequestration techniques. Conversely, if demand
is not high, prices will be low and a small number of farmers will put in the time and effort required
to sequester carbon (Gale 1955).
If private enterprise can so easily provide a solution to the problem, why hasn’t it? Voluntary
carbon markets have existed and failed in the past, and some are still operating today. The United
States’ main carbon market, the Chicago Climate Exchange, failed in 2011 after collapsed demand
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(Sabbaghi and Sabbaghi, 2016) and other factors that will be discussed later. More recently, several
private firms have begun to contract with farmers to sequester an agreed upon amount of carbon
dioxide, then sell those carbon credits by the ton to consumers.
For a modern agricultural carbon market to work, we need to understand why past markets have
failed and the dynamics of supply and demand for soil-sequestered carbon. This report and
literature review will provide information on how current and future agricultural carbon markets
can succeed and the tools necessary for fair, accurate, and effective transactions to take place in
the market.
Key factors that need to be considered include the quality of carbon offsets and the equity issues
surrounding climate change. An offset that only guarantees the sequestered carbon to remain in
the soil for five years has lower quality than an offset that guarantees the sequestered carbon will
remain in the soil for thirty years. The verification methods used to create carbon credits will also
affect the quality. Verification sources that are widely accredited and standardized will produce
higher quality offsets than verification sources that are proprietary to the voluntary market.
Additionally, voluntary carbon markets have been criticized for not being effective and simply
moving money around while not making any real long-term sequestrations (Climate Justice
Alliance 2017). This notion may be due to issues with quality credits in past carbon markets, and
will be addressed in this research.
The work for this research began with a single question: How can an agricultural carbon market
work? After doing preliminary research on the subject, five additional questions were proposed to
supplement the main question. Each of the sections in this literature review will be centered around
answering one of the five supplementary questions. These supplementary questions are:
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•

Why have past agricultural carbon markets failed?

•

What challenges do agricultural carbon markets face?

•

How can an agricultural carbon market be sustained in the long term?

•

Are agricultural carbon markets effective at sequestering carbon?

•

Are agricultural carbon markets equitable?

Literature Review
When researching the subject of voluntary agricultural carbon markets, extensive popular and
scientific literature is available. However, there are major differences between the relevancy and
helpfulness of the information in each category. The existing scientific literature covers most of
the aspects of historical carbon markets (the Clean Development Mechanism, Chicago Climate
Exchange, and Emissions Trading System) but contains very little information on modern markets.
Nori, Indigo Ag, Truterra, and other newer markets have started their programs all within the last
year or two (with some yet to begin conducting transactions) so there has not been a lot of time for
research on these markets to occur. Additionally, it will be several years before data regarding
price and volume of credits traded has built up and can be studied empirically for trends. However,
the research that has been done on the CDM, CCX, and ETS is extensive and useful for studying
how voluntary carbon markets can succeed. Scientists have studied and written about the factors
that caused each market to succeed and fail, and these publications are of immense value to anyone
looking to learn from the mistakes and triumphs of these past markets.
On the other side, popular literature has become increasingly engrossed with the subject of
agricultural carbon credits since the beginning of 2021. The change of Presidential administration
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spurred this interest as the Biden administration is determined to find economical solutions to
climate change. They have tasked the US Department of Agriculture with implementing a way for
farmers to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural operations, and USDA is
reported to be looking into the idea of a carbon bank to assist farmers and the voluntary markets.
However, many of the popular articles about the rise of voluntary markets and how American
agriculture can play a part are written with considerable skepticism towards the idea. The shutdown
of the Chicago Climate Exchange in 2010 is still fresh in the agriculture industry’s mind, and they
understandably do not want to waste effort on a repeat market that might end the same way. The
industry is also resistant to government intervention, so the idea of a federally run carbon bank is
unappealing to some.
These perceptions are important to understanding agricultural carbon sequestration as popular
articles written by agricultural publications are one of the main sources of information for
agricultural producers. Public university extension services have also been providing information
online about signing carbon credit production contracts with market firms, which is a vital source
in the absence of scientific literature.

Answered Questions
Over a decade has passed since the Chicago Climate Exchange ceased carbon credit trading
operations. In this time researchers have dug into the benefit to consumers (Gans and Hintermann
2013; Boulatoff et al 2013), the relationship between agricultural ecosystem services and
marketability (Ribaudo et al 2010), the efficiency of information exchange and data sharing
(Sabbaghi and Sabbaghi 2016), and additionality requirements (Kollmuss et al 2008). The CCX,
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along with the European Union’s Emissions Trading System and the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism, has been covered extensively in the scientific literature. The
information that is available is valuable to not only those who desire to run a voluntary carbon
market but also potential producers in the market, consumers, banks, investors, and agricultural
economists. While the Chicago Climate Exchange successfully traded hundreds of millions of
credits over the course of its operation, it ultimately came to an end. More than a decade later, with
the advantage of hindsight, multiple lessons can be learned from it that will provide for better
markets in the future.
There also exists plenty of literature on the differences between voluntary carbon markets and
other decarbonization mechanisms. An insightful paper by Jonathan D. Rubin explains how market
forces automatically act to make the least cost emissions reductions first, leading to market
efficiency (Rubin 1996). Scientists have also studied the relationship between cap and trade
legislation and prices for carbon markets (Mizrach 2012) and the effectiveness of voluntary
sequestration efforts with no government regulation (Yang 2006; Farleigh 2003). The existing
literature covers the aspects of voluntary markets, cap and trade, and carbon taxes and is continuing
to evolve as technology improves and policies are implemented.
Measurement of soil organic carbon (SOC) is vital to the functioning of any carbon sequestration
activities, and the scientific literature that discusses accurate methods of measuring changes in
SOC content is extensive. Scientists have written about the ability to measure SOC content directly
(Yan et al 2011) and on a regional scale (Stevens et al 2010), and both will be used in modern
carbon market systems. An article by Rattan Lal provides an in-depth look into the multiple factors
that affect soil carbon content, including changes in management practices (Lal 2018). Uncertainty
also exists in some methods of soil organic carbon content estimation (Ogle et al 2010), but the
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uncertainty can sometimes be accounted for in order to produce viable carbon credits anyway
(Stockmann et al 2013). While measurement technologies and methods are continuously
improving, soil carbon measurement is a subject that is pertinent to multiple fields, not just the
voluntary carbon market. The literature will continue to evolve as well.

Gaps in the Literature
Few scientific articles have been published about the re-emergence of carbon markets within the
past few years. Because these firms are so new, there has not been much literature written about
them. Significant gaps exist around the levels of supply and demand for carbon offset credits in
the present, which is pertinent information to the success of voluntary markets. Additionally, there
is an aspect of competition that has not been present in historical carbon markets. Both producers
and consumers of carbon offset credits have many choices on which market firm they want to sell
to/buy from, which creates economic competition that has not been researched.
Modern data reporting technology is an area that is also lacking scientific literature. Most firms
use similar but proprietary reporting technology, and it is of value to know how farmers use the
software. Differences in ability to report information on the software are problems that would need
to be addressed for the market to expand and provide all producers equal opportunity, but the
potential differences cannot be dealt with if they are unknown. Also, the amount of data producers
are required to report for different market firms is not public knowledge. If there were to be
scientific or informative literature comparing the data requirements for each program producers
would benefit from the additional information.

11

The final commonly overlooked issue regarding voluntary carbon markets is the equity associated
with this strategy of decarbonization. In the world of carbon offsets, the term “equity” refers to
ensuring groups who have been and will continue to be the most affected by climate change are
supplied with resources that increase their resilience. A well-researched article titled Carbon
Pricing: Effectiveness and Equity examines how the social cost of carbon relates to the price of
carbon credits in modern markets (Boyce 2018), but other than this paper there is not much else.
Equity is an important aspect of climate justice as the climate crisis affects everyone, and everyone
deserves a chance to be part of the solution. Additional research on how the voluntary markets can
be accessible to everyone would benefit policymakers and the firms running the trading platform
by helping them make informed decisions on how best to ensure equity.

Summary
Climate change is a pressing issue that requires immediate action, and a carbon market predicated
on regenerative agriculture is a potentially important solution. Information related to the factors of
supply, demand, verification, and measurement of an agricultural carbon market is critical to the
successful and long-term function of the market. The purpose of this research is to answer the
research questions in greater detail. The findings of this research will be made public and aim to
serve those who want to participate in or aid the market including farmers, agricultural commodity
boards, government officials, and carbon offset consumers.

Methods
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To adequately answer the proposed research questions, multiple methods are used in this research
project. Because the scope and topic of the research are both broad, examining both scientific and
economic factors through an analysis approach will provide a comprehensive look into the details
of agricultural carbon markets.
Over the summer of 2021, an extended literature review was completed by doing research using
scholarly databases and publicly available materials. It covered the history of carbon markets from
the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM in 1998 to the present state of recently developed private markets. The
literature review also addressed problems modern markets face that they must overcome to be
successful. When doing the research for the literature review, peer-reviewed journal articles were
the primary source of information. These articles were accessed by using UNL research databases
and specific search terms. However, a number of secondary “popular” articles were also used. This
was important to the project as the information gained from non-scientific articles allowed for
analysis of popular opinion on the subject and real interactions actors in the market have
experienced.
There are not many comprehensive, updated summaries of how agricultural carbon markets work
that relate economic principles to them, so this report was developed as a public source of
information for potential market participants. In September of 2021, it was published on the UNL
digital commons and can be accessed by anyone with an internet connection. The goal is for it to
serve as a resource for people seeking more up to date information about carbon markets and
carbon offsets as well as a collection of academic and popular resources for further exploration.
Excerpts from this report make up Chapter 1: The Past, Present, and Future of Voluntary Carbon
Markets.
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The second part of the research is focused on using existing scientific literature on the science of
soil carbon sequestration to analyze the effectiveness of different practices. Switching from
conventional till to no-till and planting cover crops are the two primary forms of carbon
sequestration that will be studied in Chapter 2. Readers of this thesis will likely find specific
expected values of soil carbon sequestration helpful, so these values will be included. Also
included will be the costs associated with the changes in practice that a farmer can expect to incur.
The final section of this thesis involves using the average cost and sequestration data found from
existing literature in Chapter 2 to create a theoretical supply curve for carbon credits. The economic
concepts of willingness to pay and willingness to accept will be considered for carbon credits, and
an equilibrium willingness to pay price will be incorporated into the supply curve graph to show
the quantities and prices at which transactions might occur. While it might not be completely
reflective of current market conditions, the graph will serve as an example framework for further
research.

Chapter 1: The Past and Present of Voluntary Carbon Markets
What are agricultural carbon offset payment programs?

Many people have heard the term “goods” before, likely in reference to products or services in the
marketplace. Not as many are familiar with the concept of an economic “bad”- the opposite of an
economic good. While goods provide the consumer with utility in the form of greater satisfaction,
economic bads detract from our utility and cause less satisfaction (Turvey 2000). As is well
established by climate science, the release of carbon dioxide from anthropogenic activities is an
economic bad (Li et al 2019). Additional carbon dioxide (a greenhouse gas) in our atmosphere
causes more heat to be trapped on Earth, resulting in a myriad of negative effects for the global
14

population (Tol 2009). Therefore, consumers who desire to lessen the effects of climate change
value less atmospheric greenhouse gases. While consumers will pay to have a greater amount of
goods, they will also pay to have a lesser amount of bads- think paying for a trash disposal service.
The actions of a single individual are relatively insignificant, but the collective action resulting
from a carbon market can potentially be enough to make a dent in the amount of carbon dioxide
in our atmosphere. This concept is fundamental to the operation of carbon offset payment
programs.
In a carbon market, consumers exchange money for the rights to claim a carbon offset, which is
an agreed upon amount of carbon dioxide that is either not emitted where it otherwise would be or
sequestered directly from the air into a non-atmospheric form (Lovell and Liverman 2010). A
carbon offset is an example of a credence good, which is a good that gives the consumer
satisfaction due to its qualities, even though the consumer cannot experience them. While the
consumer’s life is not directly made better by the transaction, they recognize the severity of the
climate crisis and gain utility from the knowledge that they are decreasing the amount of carbon
dioxide emitted. The consumer’s money is transferred to a marketplace institution that facilitates
transactions of carbon offsets between buyers and sellers, then passed on to the seller of the carbon
offset. Many of the sellers in the carbon offset market are farmers who are actively sequestering
carbon dioxide in their ground through regenerative farming practices (Giller et al 2021), and the
payment they receive helps cover any costs associated with the change of farming method.
The institution that facilitates carbon offset transactions is important for two reasons. First, carbon
dioxide offsets are dissimilar to the purchase of other products. The consumer does not receive a
physical product as they would if they went to the store and bought something, and they also do
not receive a service. Instead, they receive confirmation that a measured amount of carbon dioxide
15

has been sequestered on their behalf (Liu et al 2015). For the confirmation to be legitimate, it must
be verified. This requires accurate methods of measuring soil organic carbon (SOC), which will
be discussed later in the literature review. A carbon market institution can standardize the
verification and measurement methods, ensuring every carbon offset is equally valuable (Haya et
al 2020).
Second, the market is more efficient when there is an entity that handles the transactions between
buyers and sellers (usually these people are referred to as brokers). It would be inefficient for every
buyer to individually contact a seller that they were interested in purchasing carbon credits from
and arrange for their own measurement and verification costs (Bessy and Chauvin 2013). Some
larger farming operations might have thousands of metric tons to sell and arranging sales that
might be a few tons at a time would be both time consuming and expensive for the farm operation.
Conversely, the consumer might desire to purchase more metric tons at once than any one producer
could provide. For example, Microsoft has purchased 1.3 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
emissions offsets in 2021 through the company TruTerra (Watson 2021). As there is not an
agricultural operation producing anywhere near this amount, Microsoft would have had to expend
time and money procuring smaller amounts of offsets. Without the intermediary, the volume of
carbon offset transactions would decrease as the transaction cost would be higher, reducing
quantity demanded.
Even though the product may be unlike those in a traditional market, carbon markets are still
governed by the same economic principles of supply and demand. Given consumer demand exists
for offsets and agricultural producers are willing to invest in producing them, as well as an entity
to facilitate transactions, the result should be a net negative amount of atmospheric carbon. But
how effective are agricultural carbon offset programs?
16

Are agricultural carbon markets effective?
When tackling an issue as large as climate change, no one solution will solve the problem. Rather,
a combination of solutions involving decreasing the amount of carbon emissions now and
sequestering atmospheric carbon to extend the carbon budget will be used. Frequently touted as a
cost-effective solution (Osborne 2015), the commodification of carbon dioxide has potential to
offset a substantial portion of global climate emissions. However, critics say that the market simply
moves money around without keeping carbon dioxide out of the air (Gilbertson 2017). This section
will explore the variables that determine how much carbon dioxide agricultural carbon markets
sequester.

Voluntary vs Regulatory
Debate among economists and scientists about the way a carbon market should (or should not) be
regulated has existed since their genesis. A regulatory carbon market arises when a governing body
either imposes a tax on carbon emissions or imposes limits on carbon dioxide emissions (Schillie
n.d.). If the regulations allow pollution permits to be tradable, polluters who face high pollution
reduction costs will buy permits from polluters who face low pollution reduction costs. Prices for
the permits are established based on the buyer’s willingness to pay and the seller’s pollution
abatement costs. Like how cryptocurrencies derive their value based on a finite amount of the
currency being available, each emissions credit has value because it gives its holder the ability to
emit carbon dioxide when only a set amount can be emitted (Fang et al 2017).
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The opposite of a regulatory approach to market governance is a voluntary one. In a voluntary
carbon market, there is no emissions cap ((Schillie n.d.), so for the buyers each credit’s value
comes from consumer demand and the utility it can provide. Buyers in a voluntary carbon market
might be motivated by wanting to claim low-carbon or carbon-free status. The market is also
largely unregulated, resulting in a possible difference in standards. This type of market can cover
multiple sectors of the economy since no regulation is involved targeting specific sectors. Any
carbon offset or sequestration credit (both offset and credit refer to the same thing and can be used
interchangeably) can be priced and sold in the carbon marketplace, no matter the industry it came
from. One benefit of this type of market structure is that there is no cap to the amount of carbon
dioxide that can be sequestered (Corbera et al 2009). If supply and demand push the equilibrium
quantity above where the cap would be if the market were government regulated, the voluntary
market is more successful than the regulated one at sequestering carbon.
Another advantage the voluntary market has is that it fosters innovation (Guigon 2010). In
response to the questionable results of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), standards in the North American voluntary market were developed to determine how
much carbon was being sequestered beyond normal rates- a concept known as additionality
(Michaelowa et al 2019). Also, because there is less regulation and compliance guidelines, more
entities are free to enter and exit the market. Regulated markets can sometimes have the unintended
effect of keeping some producers out because they lack technical or financial capital (Guigon
2010). In a voluntary agricultural carbon market, any producer is free to participate if their carbon
offsets meet the standard put forth by the market for a particular offset. This effect helps keep
smaller producers on the same footing as the larger corporations.
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In considering the potential effectiveness of a particular offset market, it is imperative that the
perspective of the farmer-suppliers be considered as well as that of the buyers. An overwhelming
majority of farmers prefer a voluntary approach to carbon markets over a regulatory one (Kitchens
2020; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2021; Schattenberg 2021). Reasons for this include
a general dislike of government constraints that limit their ability to do what they think is best for
their crop. In a voluntary market, farmers choose to participate in the marketplace and make
changes in the way they farm, whereas regulatory market conditions might force them to make
changes they don’t want to. Carbon sequestration credit producers are also concerned about the
increasing amount of market power wielded by agricultural product buyers and the possibility of
losing market share to large companies. Voluntary markets allow small producers to participate in
the same market as the corporations, whereas if a compliance market were to be put in place they
might not be able to participate due to possible economies of scale in meeting regulatory
requirements.
Overall, the existing literature shows that the benefits of regulatory and voluntary carbon markets
are mixed. Voluntary markets may have a credibility problem. The lesser standards for offsets
produce credits that won’t last as long, and the variability in verification services reduces the
amount of standardization. However, there is a downside to regulatory markets as well. Basic
supply and demand show the same thing: when a tax or restriction is placed on the market, price
increases and quantity demanded decreases, resulting in a deadweight loss and a less efficient
market (Hausman 1981). There is not enough evidence to definitively say whether one type of
market structure is better than the other, so the effectiveness of a carbon market will depend heavily
on other factors.
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Regional vs Global
The scope of agricultural carbon markets is another determinant of their efficacy. Regional markets
have the potential to be specialized and better serve producers locally, but global markets give
access to remote producers and people in places where a regional carbon market does not exist
(Michaelowa 2011). Due to the scale at which global markets operate, they are less likely to be
regulated as well. Perhaps the most well-known global carbon market is the Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) that allowed the trading of carbon credits internationally
and aimed to promote sustainable development in rural communities. Unfortunately, the CDM
failed to deliver on most of its promises (Subbarao and Lloyd 2011) and the legitimacy of its
credits was called into question.
In a 2017 research paper, NYU Professor of Environmental Studies Jessica F. Green argues that
linking regional carbon markets into a larger conglomerate ultimately makes them less effective.
Green’s reasoning is that the more governments there are trying to regulate a carbon market, the
more volatile prices can be within the market (Green 2017). However, Green’s discussion of
linking carbon markets refers to compliance markets that arise from government regulations, not
voluntary markets. She notes that if it were possible to create one central, global carbon bank the
stability of the market would likely be enough to promote trade and expansion, but the difference
in standards and currencies simply make the idea unattainable. Contrarily, in a 2010 research paper
Fankhauser and Hepburn argue that the linking of carbon markets provides flexibility in the
market, which helps to reduce compliance costs producers face. They also note that in a more
traditional product market, the higher the number of buyers and sellers the greater the stability of
the market (Fankhauser and Hepburn 2010) (Lanzi et al 2012). While the combining of regional
markets for other products often produces favorable results, carbon credits are not like other
20

products. As it stands right now, the existing literature is not clear on which geographic approach
produces the most effective results for carbon sequestration.

Effectiveness of Agricultural Carbon Markets
In the existing literature surrounding meaningful carbon dioxide sequestration because of carbon
market policies, scientists make cases for and against the practice. It is widely recognized as a costeffective solution to the climate crisis (Boyce 2018) due to classic economic reasoning. When
faced with a negative externality, consumers choose the cheapest way to internalize the externality,
enabling society to efficiently allocate resources to the problem (Yin and Lawphongpanich 2006).
This leads to “picking the low-hanging fruit” first and quickly decreasing atmospheric carbon
dioxide in the most efficient way.
As discussed before, implementation of a compliance carbon market often leads to an increase in
innovation in response. The United States’ cap and trade system for sulfur dioxide emissions is a
fitting example of this phenomenon. According to a research paper from 2000, this program caused
rapid technological innovation to occur within the first 10 years of its use (Burtraw 2000), enabling
power

plants

to

cut

back

on

sulfur

dioxide

emissions

even

more.

Data from the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) supports this concept further.
The ETS is a compliance carbon offset market resulting from emissions caps on carbon dioxide.
It involves members of the European Union in a cap-and-trade system, and many of its carbon
credits come from agriculture. After the commodification of carbon dioxide in the EU, patents
regarding “low carbon technologies” increased (Calel and Dechezlepretre 2016). We could expect
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a similar jumpstart to U.S. funding and research if American carbon markets grew to a place of
prominence in our agricultural and resource economies.
Carbon markets have another advantage over other types of emissions reduction policies. Anyone
is welcome to participate in a carbon market, resulting in greater equity (Stavins 2008). Carbon
taxes usually regulate large industrial centers and power plants, excluding individuals to some
extent (although the tax might get passed on in some capacity to the consumer). However, in a
carbon market any individual is free to offset his or her personal emissions directly through the
purchase of carbon credits.
Most of the critical literature on voluntary carbon markets focuses on the fact that when
implemented alone, they will not sequester enough atmospheric carbon to keep Earth’s warming
below a tipping point of 1.5°C (Kuhns and Shaw 2018). This is true, and the fact is climate change
is a global problem with many necessary solutions. An agricultural carbon market will be most
effective when used in conjunction with other forms of carbon dioxide emission reduction and
sequestration. Carbon taxes and cap and trade are two other useful tools which will be discussed
in the next section.

Other Methods of Reducing Emissions
Carbon Tax
A tax on carbon is one government way of dealing with carbon emissions directly. The economic
reasoning supporting a carbon tax is that carbon dioxide is a pollutant that creates a decrease in
social welfare, so raising the cost of emitting a metric ton of carbon should decrease the quantity
that is emitted (Metcalf 2019). If a government is considering implementing a carbon tax, they
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commission research to find the optimal price of the tax so that an effective amount of carbon
dioxide will not be emitted when it otherwise would be. Supporters of a carbon tax argue that the
tax keeps fossil fuels in the ground, which is one of the most effective ways to minimize the release
of carbon in the first place (Van der Ploeg and Withagen 2014). They also say it is the most cost
effective at bringing down emissions levels (Lin and Li n.d.). Proposed ideas for the revenue
generated from a carbon tax include reinvesting the funds into renewable energy research, a rebate
to the American taxpayer, or a combination of both.
Any solution comes with drawbacks, however. One of the main criticisms of carbon taxes is that
they unfairly distribute the tax burden over income levels (Williams III et al 2015). It is considered
a regressive tax because low-income persons would pay a larger fraction of their income in the tax
than would higher income persons. This decreases the tax burden for an individual the higher their
income level is, and some economists claim that a carbon tax would have this effect. It may also
be politically difficult to implement, depending on the public’s perception of what will be done
with the tax revenue (Gevrek and Uyduranoglu 2015). Still, these issues are ones that can be
overcome for a carbon tax to be implemented and work alongside agricultural carbon markets
synergistically.

Cap and Trade
Cap and trade is frequently mentioned in conjunction with carbon markets. The term is used to
refer to when a government sets a limit on the amount of a pollutant that can be released over a set
time period (the “cap”) and then distributes emissions permits to firms in the affected industries
(Stavins 2008). Each firm can then decide to either reduce their own emissions and sell their excess
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permits (if any) or continue to emit at the same level and buy permits from other firms to comply
with the policy. This results in efficient use of resources by industry as the cheapest methods of
reducing emissions are employed first (Chen et al 2020). Proponents of a cap and trade system
argue it is beneficial for this reason as well as its ability to put a hard cap on the amount of annual
emissions, providing a degree of certainty (Kaufman 2016).
Critics of cap and trade claim energy producers and other carbon intensive industries are too hard
hit by the policy (Curtis 2014) and the technology for low carbon operations does not exist yet.
However, this first criticism seems to be directed at the EPA’s Nitrous NOx Budget Trading
Program and not at any carbon cap and trade program. As shown by the effect of the U.S.
government putting a cap on sulfur dioxide emissions, innovation flourishes in response to efforts
to curb pollution. Others argue that there exists a “rebound effect” that limits the gains in emissions
cuts received by increasing efficiency due to consumer behavior (Jarke-Neuert and Perino 2020).
While there may be some drawbacks economically, multiple governments have employed cap and
trade programs with success (Wood 2018), and again is a tool in the overall need to lower carbon
emissions.

Summary
As discussed in the introduction, global climate change is too large a problem to require just one
solution. Evidence from both voluntary and regulatory carbon market performance shows that they
are effective at sequestering (in the case of agriculture) and keeping carbon dioxide from being
released (in the form of offsets), while the polices of a carbon tax and cap and trade help by setting
emissions caps and regulating heavy carbon industries. The degree to which each is employed
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around the world will vary by region, but all three are valid solutions to help stop anthropogenic
climate change. A report by the World Resources Institute finds that as long as these policies are
well designed, most critics’ claims are no longer supported by evidence (Kaufman 2016). Several
voluntary carbon markets have existed in the past or still exist today, and the next section will
focus on the successes and failures of each.

History of Programs That Provide Carbon Offset Payments to
Farmers
The concept of a carbon market that trades offsets generated by agriculture is not a novel one.
Earlier markets, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), linked large and small scale
producers and consumers to trade 680 million metric ton credits throughout the course of its
operation (CCX 2010). Even before the CCX was the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism, which was a compliance market created to encourage investment from “developed”
countries into emissions offset projects in “developing” ones. Later, the European Emissions
Trading System was founded and still trades credits today. What were the successes and failures
that led these markets to where they are now?

The Chicago Climate Exchange
The most prominent American carbon market, the Chicago Climate Exchange, began trading in
2003 as a voluntary market for six different greenhouse gases (Clark 2005). CCX sought large
businesses and governing entities as consumers and garnered carbon offsets from agricultural
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producers, mainly the forestry sector (Streck et al 2009). Members could then purchase CCX
offsets to comply with the commitments they had made to CCX, described below.
There were two initial phases to the CCX. In phase I, members of the Chicago Climate Exchange
made a legally binding commitment to decrease their emissions by 1% every year between 2003
and 2006 (Clark 2005). Each member’s baseline emissions were calculated by taking the average
of the respective entity’s emissions between 1998 and 2001, and the changes in emissions levels
were found by comparing current emissions output (minus credits) against the baseline emissions
number. Phase II occurred from 2006 through 2010 and required members to achieve emissions
levels 6% below their baseline value by 2010. Members had the option of either reducing their
own physical emissions (by decreasing production or upgrading to lower carbon technologies) or
purchasing carbon offsets through the exchange. Carbon offsets could only be used to fulfill up to
50% of each member’s reduction obligation, however. Participation in Phase I was not required to
participate in Phase II, although the emissions reductions requirements remained unchanged at 6%
below baseline for all Phase II members.
Offsets purchased by members were verified by an approved third-party service to maintain the
integrity of the system and give the offsets their value. Objective verification is a necessary
component of carbon markets; without it the market would have less price stability and fail to
sequester the reported amount of pollutant (Moura Costa et al 1999). To sell offsets on the Chicago
Climate Exchange, each offset producer was required to hire their own verification service from a
selection of CCX approved firms for an annual verification inspection (De Pinto et al 2010). The
offset market was wide in scope. As of 2007, 82 million tons of offsets were generated in just the
three years prior from 9,000 farmers on 16 million acres (about the area of South Carolina) of land.
Most of these projects were within the United States, but about a quarter were internationally
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located. To participate in the Chicago Climate Exchange, each offset producer had to prove their
method of generating offsets met the requirements for additionality. Their method could not
already be required by law and was required to be an “uncommon” practice within their industrial
sector. Applications from offset producers were reviewed by an offsets committee within CCX to
ensure their project would provide quality emissions offsets, and if approved the measured and
verified amount of offsets would be sold on the CCX market.
Companies and municipalities that participated in the CCX did so voluntarily, which is partly what
caused the market to eventually fail. While the commitments to reducing emissions were legally
binding, supply simply outstripped demand. Up to 50% of CCX offsets could be used to satisfy
the emissions reduction targets, but as of 2007 only 15% of reductions achieved under the CCX
program came from offsets. Members joined for the opportunity to advertise their “green”
stewardship to consumers or out of a sense of social responsibility, but no laws existed requiring
heavy polluters to account for their carbon emissions. It appears that when the fiscal crisis of 2008
hit, companies simply lost interest in their own carbon footprint and instead redirected their efforts
towards keeping their stock price from plummeting. After Phase II ended in 2010, the Chicago
Climate Exchange was no longer trading emissions credits (Spaargaren and Mol 2013) due to lack
of demand.

The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
Created as a piece of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was
a compliance offset tool that was used to meet the carbon emission limits set on each participating
country (Barrett 1998). Pioneering the field of carbon offset markets, the CDM faced many
27

challenges over the course of its operation. Its main component involved the funding of emissions
reductions projects in lower-income countries by higher-income countries so that the higher
income-countries could claim the carbon offsets produced by the project. The market was
advertised as a solution to climate change as well as economic stimulus for lower-income countries
and thus attracted many supporters (Gillenwater and Seres 2011). A key feature was the flexibility
of the mechanism- it allowed countries time to develop and implement low-carbon technologies
while funding carbon emissions reductions in lower cost regions of the world (Grubb et al 2010).
Additionality was a major challenge for the Clean Development Mechanism. The scientists behind
the CDM worked at creating an extensive set of guidelines and rules to determine if proposed
projects would have occurred without the influence of the CDM (Greiner and Michaelowa 2003),
and thus they knew that to be effective the mechanism had to be reliable and trustworthy. An
Executive Board issued the final decision after discussion about a project, and once approved the
offset could be sold in the marketplace. Verification costs also proved to be greater than expected,
leading to high transaction costs in the market (Joshi 2012).
The CDM hits its peak in 2008 after being linked with the EU’s Emissions Trading System which
created a broader marketplace and encouraged participation (Michaelowa et al 2019). However,
this occurred at the same time as the global fiscal crisis, leading to the same outcome as the
Chicago Climate Exchange. By linking the CDM and ETS, there was simply an oversupply of
credits at a time when demand was dropping. The price of a credit subsequently decreased (Green
2017) to the point where the market was not a worthwhile endeavor for producers. Today, the
CDM still maintains active sequestration projects but does not have anywhere near the level of
activity it contained thirteen years ago.
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The European Union’s Emissions Trading System
In response to new commitments set by the European Union on the amount of carbon dioxide
emitted annually, the Emissions Trading System (ETS) was developed as the trading vehicle for
the cap and trade system (European Commission 2021). Instead of relying on individuals’
voluntary inclinations to purchase carbon offsets like the Chicago Climate Exchange, governments
set a cap on the amount of emissions to ensure its targets were met. The cap was to be decreased
every year, eventually drawing emissions down to a more sustainable number. This cap and trade
method is touted as economically efficient because it will result in the least-costly emissions
reductions happening first (Mandell 2008). It also allows for flexibility in the industry for polluters
who may not be able to immediately reduce their carbon footprint. If the technology is not readily
available but could be developed within a feasible amount of time, firms can choose to buy
allowances from the ETS market until they can reduce their own carbon emissions.
Along with the CCX and CDM, the ETS was dramatically affected by the 2008 financial crisis.
From 2008-2012, a backlog of credits piled up as extremely limited demand left prices low.
However, the European Union commission overseeing the function of the ETS market produced a
solution that enabled the system to survive. They introduced a measure that postponed the
auctioning off of 900 million carbon credits until 2019 (European Commission 2017). Supply was
artificially reduced as a result, which coincided with slowly increasing demand as the world’s
economies recovered. Prices began to return to pre-recession levels, and the commission was
careful to maintain a sustainable balance of credits in the market so as to not force the price to be
too high or too low. This solution, called the Market Stability Reserve, serves as an important
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lesson for carbon markets. The supply of credits in a marketplace can be reduced by temporarily
banking credits to ensure prices remain high enough to incentivize production of credits by future
projects (Kreibich and Hermwille 2021). Otherwise, trading will come to a halt and the market
will have a tough time recovering.

Summary
The three historical carbon markets listed above offer a wealth of information for us to learn from.
A multitude of literature has been written discussing aspects of each market, and the modern
markets are remarkably similar in some ways. The ETS is notably the only market out of these
three that is still trading a high volume of credits today, due to their Market Stability Reserve
action. While a similar policy could not be enacted in a voluntary market due to the absence of a
single governing body, the individual private marketplaces could adopt policies that restrict the
number of new credits if supply within that marketplace gets too high. This would help to ensure
that voluntary carbon markets of the present are sustainable in the long term.

Status of Current Programs and Proposals for Carbon Offset
Payments to Farmers
Nori
Founded in the fall of 2017, Nori began as a business plan entry in the “ConsenSys Blockchain for
Social Impact Hackathon” (Nori 2021). After winning the competition, the business plan was
turned into a real company and has been growing quickly. Nori’s goal is to enlist agricultural
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producers to supply carbon offsets through change of practices, then sell those offsets on their own
voluntary carbon market (Thompson et al 2021). One crucial aspect of running a successful carbon
offset market is having well defined methodology: policies and specific verification methods that
are standardized across all suppliers so that each carbon offset credit has equal value. Nori provides
this information with their “Croplands Methodology” document, which explains the eligibility of
crop types, additionality, length of the project, and the lifecycle of one of their offset credits.
Nori’s carbon offsets are called “Nori Removal Tonnes” (NRT) and are equivalent to one metric
ton of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere. Currently, Nori bases their offsets on the
standard of how likely the carbon is to stay in the ground for at least 10 years (Nori 2020). When
an NRT is sold, Nori assigns it a score reflecting the likelihood of the carbon meeting this longevity
standard. The supplier of the NRT is then paid accordingly. By using a scoring system for
longevity, the marketplace innately encourages suppliers to use quality carbon sequestration
practices and continue carbon storage into the future.
Similar to the cryptocurrency market, Nori uses blockchain technology to keep track of and verify
transactions made in their marketplace (Donnelly 2020). Each NRT produced by one of their
suppliers is turned into a token which enables it to be tracked via blockchain (Chen 2018).
Consumers of Nori’s credits can instantly and securely purchase and receive NRTs, removing
costly and time-consuming human-based security actions (Woo et al 2020). Currently each NRT
is sold for $15 per metric ton of carbon dioxide plus a 15% transaction fee for Nori’s marketplace
services, and the supplier of the NRT receives the full $15 purchase price. Once an NRT token is
sold, it is immediately retired from the marketplace and cannot be sold further (Nori 2020). These
combined practices ensure proper carbon accounting for credits sold by Nori and bar any double
counting of offsets.
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Indigo Ag
Indigo Ag is a more recent participant in the carbon offsets industry. They began seeking out
farmers in early 2021 to provide carbon sequestration credits by practicing regenerative agriculture
(Spratt et al 2021). The company’s approach is centered around the farmer. Indigo works with
farmers to determine the amount of land enrolled in the program, then it is up to the farmer to make
changes in the way they farm and send that data to Indigo. The farmer continues to collect and
send data to Indigo over the course of the year, and Indigo takes a physical soil sample from
selected acres (Indigo 2021). After receiving a farmer’s annual data and the results of the soil
samples, Indigo calculates the amount of carbon dioxide that has been sequestered and sends the
number to Verra, an independent verification firm. They verify the amount of carbon sequestered
with their Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) (Verra 2021), and Indigo is then free to market and
sell the carbon credits. Once the credits sell, the producer receives payment for their sequestration
efforts.
For agricultural producers who register acres with Indigo right now, a potential credit price of $15
per metric ton of carbon dioxide is advertised. Indigo notes that as the market expands, this price
is subject to change in response to supply and demand. Several large companies have signed
contracts with Indigo already, promising to purchase carbon offsets at a price of $20 per ton (Indigo
2021). The difference between the consumer purchase price and the payment the producer receives
goes towards verification of the credits and the upkeep of the marketplace. By aggregating carbon
credits to be sold to consumers on the voluntary market, transaction costs between parties are
minimized (Wang et al 2021) and theoretically more credits should be exchanged as a result.
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The Indigo Carbon market program was created after the company’s 2019 Terraton Initiative
(Keenor et al 2021), a challenge to sequester one trillion tons of carbon dioxide in the world’s soils
and improve soil and atmospheric health as a result. Indigo encouraged individuals and teams to
innovate and improve on existing technology for sequestration and verification of soil organic
carbon, with rewards for the best ideas (UBC 2019). This is just one example of how the need for
voluntary carbon markets sparks technological advancement and can result in more carbon dioxide
sequestered.

Truterra
A third prominent U.S. voluntary carbon market is Truterra’s TruCarbon program. Truterra is
farmer-owned and operates Land O’Lakes’ sustainability program, currently making TruCarbon
the only farmer owned voluntary carbon market available (Boland et al 2020). Its process of
generating carbon credits is very similar to those of Nori and Indigo Ag. First, the farmer registers
acres with the TruCarbon program and implements one or more change of practices. Throughout
the growing and harvesting season, data is collected and sent to Truterra and stratified soil samples
are taken and tested after harvest. The stratified soil testing process divides soils into zones that
are likely to have similar changes in SOC, and Truterra employs this method to save costs. Using
the aggregated data and results from the soil sample tests, Truterra determines additionality and
verifies the appropriate amount of carbon sequestered. After verification, the carbon credits go
through certification against market standards then can be sold to buyers in the marketplace. Even
after the credits are sold, the farmer must continue to provide information on how they are keeping
up practices that retain the carbon in the soil (Truterra 2021).
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A notable aspect of the TruCarbon program is the willingness to accept carbon sequestration that
occurred up to five years ago (Thompson et al 2021). This “look back” policy is different from
other modern voluntary carbon markets. Most programs require the registration of acres first, then
implementation of the change of practice that satisfies additionality, but Trucarbon is unique in
this way. However, as the carbon offset market continues to develop, the focus on higher quality
credits that have proven additionality will likely be increased.
As a company that already conducts agricultural business outside of the voluntary carbon markets,
Truterra has a valuable resource at its disposal. Data sharing and management are considered to
be critical to the success of voluntary carbon markets (Amelung et al 2020). When producers can
efficiently organize and send management data to the market aggregator, the quality and therefore
marketability of the credits will be higher. Truterra has developed an “insights engine” to
streamline the process of reporting additionality and continued stewardship practices. Some
commercial bulk purchasers of carbon credits will find value in this additional layer of data when
they can market their offsets as being maintained in the soil and have the data to support this claim
(Cerri et al 2021).

Challenges Facing Modern Voluntary Carbon Markets
Supply and Demand
One of the main reasons the Chicago Climate Exchange failed is the lack of demand and
overabundant supply. The fiscal crisis of 2008 shifted the world’s focus from fixing the future to
fixing the present, and demand ultimately dried up when companies were forced into survival
mode. On the opposite end of the spectrum, between the Clean Development Mechanism, the
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Emissions Trading System, and the Chicago Climate Exchange there were simply too many
sequestration projects verified and producing credits. This led to a large supply of credits with
limited buyers (DiPerna 2018).
To maintain a balanced supply of carbon credits that meets demand, firms that are trying to create
a carbon market should carefully research the economics of the industry and only register a
predetermined number of acres. This will ensure that the price of their carbon offset certificates
remains high enough to incentivize the production of more credits and provide producers with fair
compensation. Legislation, such as the Growing Climate Solutions Act, focuses on issues
surrounding a fair price for farmers to receive for credits and was passed by the Senate but not by
the House in June of 2021 (US Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 2021).
As far as demand goes, much has happened in the eleven years since the end of the CCX. Climate
education is now a fundamental part of the scientific curriculum in many school districts around
the country (Schreiner et al 2008). Youth movements have begun to affect mainstream politics
(O’Brien et al 2018), and the business world is finally seeing the problem for what it is and the
opportunities that come with it (Bristow 2021). While still very divided on the issue of climate
change politically, the majority of American society is concerned and desires immediate action.
The purchase of millions of tons of offsets by Microsoft earlier this year speaks to how desirable
the credits are, and other major US companies will soon be looking for similarly large-scale
markets to purchase from. Individual consumers who are concerned about climate change will also
bolster demand for credits as it has already become somewhat mainstream to offset emissions from
flights and other carbon intensive activities.
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Verification
Accurate verification of sequestered carbon gives the credits their value and ensures double
counting does not occur. Unlike projects like REDD+, which deal with conservation of tropical
ecosystems, a majority of carbon sequestration projects in the United States are agriculturally and
agroforestry based. Verification standards are necessary to ensure quality offsets (Streck 2020).
However, verification processes are time consuming and expensive.
Innovation is lowering the cost of verification through adaptation of technologies like blockchain
and will help make verified credits more attainable (Hua et al 2020). Blockchain also improves
security in the carbon market as it precisely records every transaction associated with a specific
credit, preventing credits being resold and the offset being claimed multiple times. Verification
services such as the Greenhouse Gas Protocol and the Verra Verified Climate Standard offer the
service to markets resulting from the need for standardized verification (Gifford 2020). To pay for
verification, some markets (such as Nori) charge a service fee for every credit purchased. Nori’s
fee is 15%, and since it is charged on top of the credit price the producer still receives full
compensation for any extra costs. This type of policy incentivizes farmers to produce credits for a
marketplace that covers verification costs and standardizes the credits sold in the marketplace.

Data Utilization
Each marketplace is different when it comes to data privacy. As there is no tangible physical
product being exchanged during carbon sequestration, data sharing is key to creating and verifying
the carbon credits (Amelung et al 2020). Market firms need to know how long the carbon will be
in the soil, the density of carbon in the soil before and after the change of practice, and current
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management practices on the acres involved. Markets will have different requirements about data
sharing regarding the type, frequency, and availability of the data, so farmers who are considering
participating in the market should examine all aspects of the agreement made with the marketplace
about data ownership (Brooks 2021).

Longevity of Offsets
To be effective in reducing carbon dioxide levels and preventing the worst effects of climate
change, some degree of permanence must be established for the carbon sequestration credits in a
marketplace. Agricultural carbon sequestration is unique in that the carbon that has been
sequestered can be released again due to improper management. For example, a farmer could
change from conventional till to no till and sell carbon credits for his or her land. However, if the
land is then sold, or a lease expires, and a new operator manages that ground now they might not
continue the same sequestration practices. Re-tilling of the ground would release most of the
carbon from the previously sequestered offsets (McLauchlan 2006) and result in invalidation of
the credits that had already been sold. For operators of family farms and land that has been held
for generations, this will not pose much of an issue but 54% of cropland is rented land in the United
States (USDA-ERS and USDA-NASS 2014). If a farmer who rents wants to participate in a carbon
market, an agreement will have to be reached with the landlord about the longevity of the offsets.
This might entail prevention of certain tillage practices on the land for a specified length of time.
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Chapter 2: Science and Effectiveness of Soil Carbon
Sequestration
Introduction

A frequently suggested solution to the global problem of climate change is the sequestration of
atmospheric carbon dioxide by soils. Because agricultural land is already under management and
there are several regenerative agriculture practices available to be implemented, the industry is in
a strong position to reduce carbon dioxide levels through farming. Recent studies suggest up to 5
Gt of carbon dioxide per year could be sequestered in soils using these methods (Paustian et al
2019) which would make a significant dent in the problem. The goal of this report is to further
investigate these methods for their effectiveness and costs based on reviewing existing scientific
literature. Quantitative information about agricultural soil carbon sequestration is valuable to both
farmers and the public, so these numbers will be included based on data from a collection of longterm experiments.

Effectiveness of agronomic practices at storing carbon dioxide
Two main agricultural practices have been suggested to sequester carbon in the soil while
continuing to grow crops. The first is moving from conventional tillage to no-till, which reduces
the amount of exposure to air the soil has and therefore decreases the release of carbon dioxide.
The second practice is cover cropping, which puts carbon back into the soil through photosynthesis
when a field would otherwise lay fallow. Each of these practices has costs and benefits aside from
carbon sequestration, and these will be discussed later. In this section, no-till and cover cropping
will be analyzed for their realistic carbon sequestration potential using a collection of scientific
studies and other resources.
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No-till
In order to understand why switching from conventional till to no-till is effective at sequestering
carbon, some background on soil science is needed. When plants perform photosynthesis, their
roots carry carbon-containing compounds down the plant and into the soil (Kumar et al 2006).
These compounds are released through root respiration and enter the soil as soil organic carbon
(SOC). If soil is left undisturbed over time, aggregates (small clumps of soil held together by SOC)
form. Aggregation prevents organic matter in the soil from being decomposed by soil
microorganisms (NDSU 2021), and since the organic matter is underground, it cannot enter the
atmospheric carbon dioxide pool. Additionally, organic litter is left on the surface of the field when
the field is not plowed. This further helps to prevent any soil organic matter from decomposing
(Ogle et al 2005) although the litter on the surface is still susceptible to decomposition.
When tillage occurs, aggregates are broken up into smaller pieces. At the same time, as the soil is
turned and tossed around it is exposed to air. With no aggregation to prevent decomposition plus
exposure to sunlight and water, the molecules with carbon begin to break down into gaseous carbon
dioxide (Schley et al 2018). Therefore, fields where one crop is grown during the main growing
season and lay fallow through the rest of the year have a carbon cycle where more carbon is
sequestered as the crop grows and carbon dioxide is released during the remaining 6-8 months
(Ogle et al 2012). The opportunity to sequester additional carbon in the soil for a more permanent
period comes from the fact that agricultural soils have been depleted of carbon from many years
of tillage (Guo and Gifford 2002). One study finds that the decrease is in the range of 30-50% over
50 years of permanent agriculture (Valkama et al 2020). Gradually, the amount of SOC can be
built back up using regenerative agriculture methods.
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Much scientific analysis has been done on the effectiveness of no-till practices at storing carbon
in the soil, and the results vary widely. A 2002 study found that after switching from conventional
tillage to no-till, it takes time for soil aggregates to form and meaningful carbon sequestration to
begin (West and Post 2002). Their data showed that carbon sequestration rates peak between 5-10
years after the change is made, and the soil reaches the equilibrium point about 15-20 years after
no-tillage has been implemented (West and Post 2002). When the equilibrium point is reached,
soil sequestration experiences a dramatic decrease. A different scientific study explored the impact
of soil aggregates re-forming using a conceptual model representing the multiple stages of
macroaggregate formation. The researchers attribute a majority of soil carbon loss to the
destruction of macroaggregates during tillage, but not all. Results from the model showed that in
fields where no-till was implemented, the number of soil macroaggregates doubled compared to
conventionally tilled fields. In addition, the average time for carbon to remain sequestered in the
soil also doubled (Six et al 2000). These findings provide support for no-till being an effective
carbon sequestration method.
Specific values regarding the efficacy of switching from conventional tillage (moldboard plow) to
no-till range from 0.02 to 0.29 metric tons of carbon per acre per year. Valkama et al simulated
crop growth over 20 years using no-till methods and data from Kazakhstan, Finland, and Italy.
Their simulated measurements reached from 0-30 cm deep into the soil, a standard range for SOC
sampling. The results from the simulation showed that sequestration rates of 0.06 to 0.22 metric
tons of carbon per acre per year were likely, with the warmer climate areas of study having
sequestration rates on the higher end of the spectrum (Valkama et al 2020*). Another study finds
comparable results. West and Post 2002 synthesized 67 long-term experiments on changing from
conventional till to no-till and worked with SOC data from the 0-30 cm depth. Their findings were
40

that depending on the region and climate, a farmer could expect to sequester between 0.17 and
0.29 metric tons of carbon per acre per year using the no-till method (West and Post 2002*).
Finally, two experiments in Ohio study the effect of switching to no-till over multiple decades.
One dataset ran for 49 years while the other ran for 47 years, but both returned the same results:
average SOC sequestration for the 0-30 cm depth was 0.02 metric tons of carbon per acre per year
(Kumar et al 2012*). While this value may seem low, there is a likely explanation. After about 20
years of no-till management, SOC levels tend to plateau. Because the research was over a period
of almost 50 years, the annual sequestration is likely lower than it would have been at the 20-year
mark.
Not all researchers agree, however. A decade-long experiment indicated that after 10 years there
were no significant differences in sequestered SOC between conventional tillage and no-till test
plots (Sheehy et al 2015). One proposed explanation for the lack of additional soil carbon in the
no-till plot is the no-till plot produced a lower yield than the conventional till plot. With less plant
growth comes less soil carbon sequestration, even if the lack of tillage enabled more
microaggregates to form. In 2010, researchers compared the results of 69 different studies and
determined that switching from conventional till to no-till had “no significant difference” on the
amount of carbon sequestered (Luo et al 2010). On average, carbon levels decreased regardless of
the tillage method. Luo et al found that carbon levels tended to increase within the first 10 cm of
soil but decreased in all levels below 10 cm. However, Luo et al found a different practice to be
effective at carbon sequestration. Their results showed greatly increased SOC levels within the
first 60 cm of the soil when cropping frequency (the amount of time a field is growing crops) was
increased. This result suggests keeping the soil covered with plant growth for as much time as
possible is more effective than simply switching to no-till alone and lends support to cover
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cropping as an efficient method of soil carbon sequestration. Other researchers have also expressed
concern about methods used to investigate the carbon sequestering capacity of no-till. Baker et al
pointed out how, in many studies that find no-till to positively affect the level of carbon in
agricultural soils, the sampling depth of the soils was often 30 cm or less from the surface (Baker
et al 2007). As the roots of common U.S. agricultural crops extend far beyond the 30 cm depth
(Archontoulis et al 2017), this level of study may not be deep enough to fully understand the effect
on SOC throughout the soil horizons.
While still inconclusive about whether switching to no-till agriculture results in carbon
sequestration or not, the scientific literature shows us that if sequestration occurs it is not to the
level that many carbon offset trading platforms purport it to be. Realistically, a farmer
implementing no-till on his or her fields can expect other benefits to the health of the soil but little
to no soil carbon sequestration.

Cover cropping
When a farmer grows cover crops in the non-peak growing season, carbon sequestration is
happening for many of the same soil chemistry reasons as no-till. The shade produced by cover
crop plants reduces the rate of decomposition for any organic matter that might be on the surface
of the soil, which helps keep aggregated organic carbon in the soil. But the main reason cover
cropping leads to increased SOC is the increase of carbon inputs to the soil (Poeplau and Don
2015). In a time when the soil would otherwise be unproductive, photosynthesis is occurring in
the cover crop plants. As photosynthesis occurs, carbon compounds are generated and transported
down through the plant’s structure. From there, the organic carbon compounds are released into
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soil in the form of rhizodeposits (Moore et al 2019), increasing the level of soil organic carbon.
Additional research using test fields at the University of Minnesota found that SOC levels are
inversely related to the amount of time a field is left fallow (Baker and Griffis 2005). In other
words, the shorter amount of time a field is left without crops growing in it, the higher its SOC
levels, similar to the findings of Luo et al mentioned above. The researchers also found an inverse
relationship between soil SOC levels and the frequency and length of fallow periods. These results
further support that having plants grow even in off-peak seasons has a positive effect on the amount
of carbon stored in the soil.
Analyses on cover cropping studies by Poeplau and Don (2015) found an average positive
sequestration rate result. The researchers used data from 139 different plots at 37 sites, and their
results showed an average sequestration rate of 0.13 metric tons of carbon per acre per year
(Poeplau and Don 2015*). The experiments used in this analysis ranged from 1 to 54 years old and
measured carbon dioxide stored in the top 30 cm of the soil (called the plow layer). One interesting
estimate from the study was that the soils were expected to reach their level of carbon equilibrium
155 years after the beginning of the practice. Another study measured sequestered SOC from the
0-75 cm depth in Southern Illinois. The experiment ran for 12 years using cover crops with
conventional tillage. It was found that on average, cover crop plots sequestered an additional 0.22
metric tons of carbon per acre per year (Olson et al 2014*). Similarly, Ruis and Blanco-Canqui
2017 observed sequestration of 0.2 to 0.42 metric tons of carbon per acre per year due to cover
crops (Ruis and Blanco-Canqui 2017*). Another study on the effectiveness of cover crops
concluded that it is more common for scientific analyses to find cover cropping increases soil
carbon levels than decreases them (Tautges et al 2019). From the results of the experiments and
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analyses above, a farmer implementing cover crops while still using conventional till could expect
to sequester about 0.25 metric tons of soil carbon per acre per year.
As with no-till, there are some scientific articles that report results contrary to those that say cover
cropping has a positive effect on the level of SOC. A 2005 study used two fields- one with
conventional tillage and only planting in the optimal time of the year, and one using reduced tillage
and cover crops- to study the differences cover cropping makes. The researchers reported some
SOC increase due to the cover crop, but then a subsequent decrease immediately after the cover
crop was killed to prepare for the planting of the main crop in May (Baker and Griffis 2005). After
two years, equal carbon levels between the control and test fields led the researchers to conclude
that the methods employed in the test field made no difference in the amount of carbon sequestered.
However, it can be argued that the timeline of two years is not enough time to conclude that no
carbon sequestration was occurring at all. It commonly takes 5 to 10 years for significant changes
in soil organic carbon to be noticeable by measuring instruments (Smith 2004), so the study would
have benefitted from a longer investigative period.
Another factor influencing the rate of sequestration when a field is under cover crop management
is if the cover crop residue is removed or not. This was investigated in 2009, and the researchers
found that if organic residue is removed, cover cropping holds “little carbon sequestration
potential” (Bavin et al 2009) due to the added exposure to moisture and sunlight. However, this
conclusion has been disputed as well. Their findings may be unrepresentative of the soil’s
equilibrium condition after the soil microorganisms have had time to adjust and reproduce to the
new environment of additional organic carbon. Bavin et al, the authors of the article, even suggest
their findings are more representative of what happens when a farmer begins to use cover crops
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and no-till. As stated above, it usually takes years of adjustment for the soil to begin meaningful
sequestration (Smith 2004).

Combined practices
From the literature I reviewed, no-till and cover crops are more effective at carbon sequestration
when used in conjunction with each other. Luo et al concluded that when cover cropping was
combined with no-till agriculture, significant increases in soil carbon levels were the result (Luo
et al 2010). “Significant” was defined as observing a greater than 11% increase in carbon over a
5-year timeline and considering most agricultural soils are carbon depleted 30-50% from their
natural states (Valkama et al 2020) this appears to be a good definition. A different analysis of notill and cover cropping being used together found an annual net carbon sequestration value of 0.36
metric tons of carbon per acre (Hollinger et al 2005*). Corn and soybeans were studied in this
experiment because they are two of the most widely grown crops in the United States, confirming
that carbon sequestration is possible for these crops.
Other experiments find similarly positive results. An experiment by Ruis and Blanco-Canqui 2017
observed increases of 0.15 to 0.29 metric tons of carbon per acre per year using test plots with notill and cover crops (Ruis and Blanco-Canqui 2017*). Valkama et al 2020 found comparable results
of 0.25 to 0.26 metric tons of carbon per acre per year from a simulation of 20 years of growing
cycles (Valkama et al 2020*). The parameters of the simulation included measuring 0-30 cm in
soil depth, rotation of crops each growing season, and leaving organic residues on the field.
Another study measured to a greater depth, 75 cm into the ground. The study lasted for 12 years
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in Southern Illinois, and the results were positive: 0.49 metric tons of carbon per acre per year
(Olson et al 2014*).
Depending on the depth of the soil sample, a farmer using both no-till and cover crops could
realistically expect to sequester from 0.25 to 0.45 metric tons of soil carbon per acre per year.

Other practices
In addition to permanent operational changes made to a field, one-time actions can also result in
sequestered carbon. These include spreading manure or biochar on a field, which are usually used
to add nutrients back into the soil but can have the added benefit of carbon sequestration. Manure
and biochar decompose much more slowly than newly dead biomass, helping to both retain carbon
longer when mixed in with the soil (Paustian et al 2016) and provide cover from the sun as light
increases the rate of decomposition. The specific rate of carbon sequestration from spreading
manure was studied in a 2019 scientific article. Using test crop plots at the University of California,
researchers found that 0.55 metric tons of carbon per acre were sequestered annually by the
manure-fertilized plots compared to the conventionally managed plots (Tautges et al 2019*).
However, the transfer of carbon here is not from the atmospheric carbon pool into the soil through
photosynthesis but rather is a transfer of organic matter from one location to a larger carbon sink.
Biochar is a newer method of adding carbon back to a field. It is produced using pyrolysis, a
method of heating organic matter to an elevated temperature with low concentrations of oxygen
present (Wang et al 2015). Application of biochar to fields is considered a “frontier technology”
as more research needs to be done to explore how it can be implemented in a cost-effective way
on a wide scale as well as fully understand its long-term effects. Biochar is much more resistant to
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decay by soil microbes due to the chemical reactions it undergoes during pyrolysis, and therefore
is estimated to remain in its solid form for over one hundred years (Wang et al 2015). It also can
cause plants to be more productive, accelerating the growth of roots into the soil and the rate of
photosynthesis (Paustian et al 2019). However, spreading manure or biochar are single actions.
Unlike no-till or cover cropping, which are management practices used for the whole season, these
actions are usually taken as needed to provide plants with additional nutrients. Therefore, they do
not seem to be eligible to generate carbon credits because there is no permanent change of practice.

Logistics of carbon sequestration with each practice
Longevity of sequestered carbon
When considering the value of carbon offsets produced, permanence (how long the sequestered
carbon is expected to stay in the soil) is a major factor. The lower the amount of time expected (or
less confidence in the value) the lower the value of the generated offset will be. Permanence values
of 100 years are common for afforestation carbon sequestration projects, but it is very difficult, if
not impossible, for farmers to commit to land management practices that will exceed their lifetime
(Von Unger and Emmer 2018). Some carbon markets require permanence times of 25 years, but
even this can be a stretch for a farmer to commit to. The concern regarding permanence is that
without the requirement that the change in practice be maintained for a set amount of time, even
one year of not doing the practice could erase any gains in SOC. Multiple studies confirm this. A
2018 report by the World Resources Institute found that when farmers return to conventional
tillage after practicing no-till, much of the sequestered soil organic carbon is lost to the atmosphere
(Mulligan et al 2018). No-till encourages the production of soil aggregates over several growing
seasons, but tilling a field immediately breaks down those aggregates and they are susceptible to
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decomposition. Another article confirms this. The 2005 study on the human impacts on soil carbon
concluded that once an additionality practice is no longer used, the sequestered carbon will rapidly
return to the atmosphere (Smith 2005).
There is evidence to support combining regenerative agricultural practices to attempt to extend the
permanence value of sequestered carbon. In a research effort to determine effective ways to
enhance soil carbon stocks in soils, researchers found that when no-till and a variety of rotational
crops are used in conjunction, sequestered carbon stays in the ground for a greater period than
either no-till with monoculture or conventional till with rotational crops (Marland et al 2004).
Similar to the findings of Luo et al 2010, these results encourage the use of multiple carbon
sequestration farming methods to sequester more carbon.

Regional variation due to soil types and climate
Agriculture around the world is affected by numerous regional factors, including climate and soil
type. As one might imagine, these factors influence the rate of possible agricultural carbon
sequestration as well. Because precipitation is needed for crop production, agricultural activity is
limited at high latitude areas such as Northern Canada (<15 inches of precipitation per year) and
Siberia (6-20 inches of precipitation per year). For comparison, Nebraska ranges from 14-32 inches
of precipitation per year. Therefore, SOC sequestration is not effective in these higher latitude
areas (Smith 2012).
One in-depth analysis published in 2012 is particularly helpful. Ogle et al created a model that
used data from 74 studies on the effect of no-till on carbon sequestration rates to find which regions
of the U.S. have the greatest sequestration potential. The analysis covered both corn and wheat as
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these are some of the most widely grown crops. Their results for corn were that as you move farther
North in the United States, agricultural soils have greater carbon sequestration potential when
using no-till agriculture (Figure 1, Ogle et al 2012). Accompanying this result, there is also greater
predicted longevity of sequestered carbon farther North. The difference in potential occurs because
areas that are cooler and dryer have lower rates of decay than hot and wet coastal areas. The model
returned mixed results when using the data on winter wheat. Under no-till management, SOC
levels are expected to decrease in the Mid-Atlantic and corn belt regions but increase in the
Northern Great Plains and the South (Figure 2, Ogle et al 2012). While this data should not solely
be used to make a decision about farm management practices, it is important to keep in mind when
considering the benefits of switching from conventional tillage to no-till.

Figure 1: The top half of figure 1 shows the average change in carbon soil inputs from corn
residues. The lower half of figure 1 shows the steady-state of soil organic carbon levels after
the change from conventional tillage to no-till in corn growing fields (Ogle et al 2012).
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Figure 2: The top half of figure 2 shows the average change in carbon soil inputs from winter
wheat residues. The lower half of figure 2 shows the steady-state of soil organic carbon levels
after the change from conventional tillage to no-till in winter wheat growing fields (Ogle et
al 2012).
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Maximum levels of stored SOC
Even though there is a deficit in the amount of carbon in agricultural soils compared to nonagricultural soils, the amount of carbon soils can hold is limited. Soil ecosystems maintain a
balance of carbon and other nutrients, and the amount of carbon that can be stored in soil is called
attainable organic carbon. Net primary productivity (NPP) can be used to measure the rate of
biomass accumulation in plants and determines how much carbon moves through the roots of a
plant to be stored underground. Therefore, if NPP can be increased, the attainable level of SOC
can also be increased (Ingram and Fernandes 2001). Saturation of carbon in the soil occurs when
natural soil chemical balances prevent additional carbon inputs from sequestering SOC (West and
Six 2006). When the change of management practice is first implemented, carbon inputs are greater
than outputs. SOC level reaches a steady state when carbon inputs are equal to outputs, and
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saturation is reached. At this point, carbon is still lost from the soil but is replaced by newly
sequestered carbon equal to the value lost. This means that the soil is still actively sequestering
carbon, just at a lower rate than when the soil was not yet carbon saturated. Additionally, the effects
of climate on decomposition rates can be lessened by vegetation such as cover crops (Ingram and
Fernandes 2001).

Additional costs and benefits of each agronomic practice
As with any management practice, there are costs to implement no-till and cover cropping.
However, there are also some additional soil health and environmental benefits. Because the soil
is not being turned over every year in no-till, yields might decrease (Lerohl and Van Kooten 1995).
The economic impact of possible decreases in yield was studied in 2005. Researchers found that
on average, farmers using no-till earned an average of $11.33 less per acre than farmers who used
conventional tillage methods (Manley et al 2005*). The lowest difference in net revenue was in
the Southern U.S. where no-till producers only lost a dollar per acre on average; the highest was
in the corn belt where producers lost about $20 per acre on average. The cost of cover crops has
been studied in a similar way. Using a cost assessment model, researchers were able to determine
that implementing cover crops costs a farmer an average of $11.74 per acre per year with current
USDA programs (Roley et al 2016*). Additional planting time, fuel, seeds, and fertilizer all
contribute to these added costs.
With the added costs come numerous environmental benefits that arise from switching to no-till
or cover crops. Soil erosion is a major problem in much of the central United States, and both notill and cover crops can decrease the rate at which soils are lost (Hobbs et al 2008). Water is also
conserved using conservation agriculture (Li et al 2011), and fertilizer runoff is decreased greatly.
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Nitrous oxide is a potent greenhouse gas and can enter the atmosphere through nutrient runoff and
overapplication of Nitrogen fertilizer. Cover crops decrease runoff and take up excess soil
nitrogen, so nitrous oxide emissions might be reduced as a benefit of cover crops (Mulligan et al
2018). There are other direct benefits of increasing SOC levels, some of which are increased
cycling of nutrients, enhanced filtration of water, and minimized soil compaction (Reicosky 2003).
Reducing the amount of fertilizer and/or water needed for a crop can decrease management costs,
so it is possible these benefits could help farmers decide on operational practices going forward.
The effect on crop yield of switching from conventional tillage to no-till depends on the type of
crop being grown. Toliver et al (2012) report that on average, sorghum and wheat experienced
increased yields under no-till management while corn yields were lower than their conventional
tillage counterparts. The possible difference in yield will be either an added cost or added revenue
based on the crop grown and is an additional factor to consider.

Current levels of adoption
Data taken from the USDA-NASS's 2017 census of agriculture shows that farmers are increasingly
moving to no-till and away from conventional tillage. The census of agriculture is taken once every
5 years, so the 2017 version is the most up to date. It shows that since the previous census in 2012,
the number of agricultural acres under no-till has increased by 8% (USDA-NASS 2017).
Midwestern states lead with the highest number of no-till acres in production with Kansas,
Nebraska, and Iowa at the top of the list. The data show that cover crop adoption is growing at an
even faster rate. Between the 2012 census and the 2017 census, the number of acres under cover
crop management increased by 50% (USDA-NASS 2017) with Midwestern states again leading
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the shift. Under most voluntary carbon credit schemes, these acreages for which practices have
already changed would not be eligible for carbon credits because of the additionality requirement,
which requires that payments be made only for sequestration that occurs in addition to that being
achieved without the carbon credit

Summary
One purpose of this report was to investigate the prospects for voluntary carbon offset markets for
agricultural practices that potentially sequester carbon while still allowing the crop to be grown.
Other practices, such as the conversion of cropland to native grasslands or the planting of trees
have been shown to result in higher SOC values over time (Niu and Duiker 2006) but do not allow
the land to continue to grow crops. One important aspect of this investigation was to examine
existing agronomic literature that could help to identify the soil carbon sequestration potential of
various practices. While scientific research has found that using cover crops or cover crops in
conjunction with no-till on-average leads to positive soil carbon sequestration, the values are not
as high as some values that have been reported in the media. There exists potential for meaningful
SOC sequestration in productive agricultural lands, but whether it will be profitable for farmers to
implement the changes in practice will depend on the price they receive for any offset credits
generated.

Chapter 3: Economic Analysis of WTP and WTA for Carbon
Credits

The economic concepts of willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) allow
economists to estimate supply and demand curves for a good or service. In this case, the goal is to
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measure the price farmers would accept for a carbon credit depending on the change in practice
used to sequester the carbon. Once these prices are known, they can be compared to the prices
consumers are willing to pay for the good or service. If the price consumers are willing to pay is
above the price producers are willing to accept, the transaction will occur. A series of WTA values
can be used to approximate a supply curve. The supply curve would start at the lowest price
producers are willing to accept and run parallel to the x-axis for the quantity of products producers
are willing to supply for that price. Then, the supply curve would make a discrete movement
upward to the next lowest price and again continue parallel to the x-axis for the amount producers
are willing to supply. Until the data is exhausted, this process can be repeated to produce a stairstepped supply curve that approximates the actual supply curve for the voluntary agricultural
carbon credit market. Figure 3 shows the theoretical supply curve along with the WTP price
produced from this report.

Willingness to Accept
The WTA prices for the practices of no-till, cover crops, and the combination of both no-till and
cover crops was produced using previously researched data on average costs to implement each
practice. Traditional microeconomic thinking is employed here: producers are willing to accept at
minimum the amount it costs them to produce a product. While the costs used to generate WTA
prices are an average of what has been found in existing literature, they are not necessarily accurate
of every farmer’s situation. Costs of switching from conventional tillage to no-till vary based on
existing equipment the farmer might have access to as no-till agriculture requires a special type of
planter that injects seed directly into the soil. It also depends on the type of crop being grown as
the yields of some crops may be affected by the change to no-till. Additional data on
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implementation costs of no-till and cover crops would make Figure 3 more representative of
current market conditions. However, due to time constraints, this was not possible. Figure 3 is
intended to be a theoretical framework for how a supply curve could be constructed to approximate
the supply of agriculturally produced carbon credits and uses a limited data set as an example. An
expansion of this data set would better approximate real-world prices.

Willingness to Pay
Willingness to pay values for carbon credits are more easily found. Voluntary marketplaces have
historically sold credits in large quantities as contracts with companies and organizations that
desire to offset their carbon emissions, but recently some markets have begun to sell individual
credits directly to consumers. Nori, a private firm based in Seattle, Washington currently sells one
Nori Removal Token (NRT) for $15 plus a 15% charge for a total of $17.25. Nori’s website
explains that $15 goes directly to the farmer who produced the offset and the 15% fee goes to Nori
to “help keep the marketplace running” (Nori 2021). One NRT is equivalent to one metric ton of
carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere. This is a standard measurement for carbon offsets
and is also used in the Oil Price Information Service’s (OPIS) carbon offset reports. The OPIS
carbon report from February 2nd, 2022 shows prices around $16 per metric ton of sequestered
carbon dioxide. As the OPIS report is an aggregation of prices in multiple voluntary markets and
firms, $16 per metric ton of carbon dioxide was used as the WTP value for this analysis.
However, there is a difference between sequestered carbon and sequestered carbon dioxide. The
molecular weight of one carbon atom is 12.01 grams per mol, while the molecular weight of carbon
dioxide, which is made up of one carbon atom and two oxygen atoms, is 44.01 grams per mol.
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When 44.01 is divided by 12.01, the result is 3.664. This value can be used to convert between the
price for one ton of sequestered carbon dioxide and the price for one ton of sequestered carbon.
Multiplying $16 per ton of sequestered carbon dioxide by 3.664 indicates the value of one ton of
sequestered carbon is $58.63. Therefore, $58.63 is used as a comparison to the cost of sequestering
one ton of soil carbon. The WTP curve is represented as a horizontal line at the price of $58.63 in
Figure 3.

Economic Implications
Noticeably, the WTP price is lower than any of the WTA prices in Figure 3. As stated above,
transactions occur when WTP prices are higher than WTA prices and both producers and
consumers gain utility from the transaction. According to Figure 3, no agricultural carbon credits
would be purchased or sold in this marketplace. The graph still provides us with valuable
information though. If consumers were willing to pay between $64.73 and $73.50, 12.6 million
credits would be sold. Because no-till is the lowest cost method of sequestering atmospheric carbon
in agricultural soil, these credits would all be produced by farmers switching from conventional
till to no-till. The next least cost practice is cover crops. Figure 3 shows that an additional 1.7
million credits would be traded if consumers were willing to pay between $73.50 and $79.76 per
metric ton of sequestered carbon. Implementing both additionality practices at once on the same
acre of land costs the most and therefore produces the highest cost credits. If consumers were
willing to pay greater than $79.76 an additional 2.5 million credits would be sold for a total of 16.8
million credits traded in the marketplace. As it is though, consumers are generally not willing to
pay these higher prices for carbon credits.
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However, these transactions are occurring in the real-world marketplace even though Figure 3
suggests they should not be. There are several possible reasons for the discrepancy. First, due to
the limited amount of data used to create the supply curve, Figure 3 might be unrepresentative of
true market conditions. Three sequestration values found through scientific literature were used to
get the average sequestration for no-till and cover crops, and four values were used for the average
sequestration when both practices are used. A greater number of data points would improve the
accuracy of the estimated sequestration per acre of each practice. There is also a wide range of
values in the literature about the cost per acre of implementing no-till or cover crops due to regional
variations and climate factors. If Figure 3 was created using data from a single region with
homogenous agricultural characteristics, it would better represent the local costs to implement
changes. Subsequently, the prices producers are willing to accept would be more accurate as well.
Another possible explanation as to why carbon credit transactions are occurring at a price of $58.63
is that farmers might not be receiving fair compensation. If the data used to create Figure 3 are
representative of the true costs of the changes in practice, then farmers are not being paid an
amount equivalent to their expenses to do the change in practice. However, there are other benefits
to both no-till and cover crops besides monetizable soil carbon sequestration. Improved soil health,
water management, and reduced soil erosion are all effects of using regenerative agricultural
practices as well. If a monetary value can be placed on these benefits, the cost of making the change
in practice might make financial sense for the farmer. Future research on this topic would be useful.
While Figure 3 differs from what is happening in the voluntary carbon credit market right now, it
is still useful as a model for how to estimate the supply curve of agriculturally produced credits.
More data would improve its accuracy, or it could be used in a more localized way that measures
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the cost of producing credits in a specific region. Either way, the framework used to build the
supply curve and WTP line in Figure 3 could be replicated in other studies.

Figure 3: WTA and WTP for carbon credits produced by agricultural soil sequestration of
carbon. The red stair-stepped line represents a supply curve based on the costs of soil
carbon sequestration for different practices. The blue line represents a WTP price based on
current market data.

Conclusion

Voluntary carbon markets and soil carbon sequestration are two of many important tools we have
available to help reverse the consequences of the climate crisis. It is encouraging to see a
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resurgence of interest in the industry, although both consumers and producers require more
information than is available to fully understand the benefits and potential drawbacks. Education
can come from a variety of sources: popular articles, scientific literature, university extension
services, etc. Every method of carbon sequestration and emissions reduction has pros and cons,
and it is important to remember that these solutions can be used in concert with one another to
meet emissions reductions goals. Regional differences, political atmospheres, and market systems
will contribute to which methods are suitable for a specific area. But the baseline is this: consumers
desire carbon sequestration credits, and agricultural producers have a way to potentially monetize
their effort into producing the credits. The two groups just need to be connected.
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